in its purview. In addition, however, the Common Rule exempts some research involving human subjects from its standard procedural review requirements, which complicates matters. Only after determining whether a project represents research involving human subjects, and determining whether it qualifies as exempt, do we know whether an IRB should review it.
Caveats, Qualifications, and Conditions
everal external factors have a bearing on whether the Common Rule applies. From an ethical standpoint, these factors may be irrelevant to the question of whether they should be beyond the reach of the Common Rule. Many experts have argued that participants in research outside the scope of the Common Rule's authority deserve equal protection. From an administrative legal standpoint, however, these factors do influence the applicability of the Common Rule and must be taken into account.
Funding. First, the proposed activity must be funded or supported by the federal government; private sector research is not within the scope of the Common Rule. In fact, only research funded or supported by one of the federal agencies that has adopted the Common Rule must conform; neither other executive branch entities (e.g., the Department of Labor) nor any judicial or legislative branch entities (e.g., the General Accounting Office) must comply with the Common Rule. Research jointly funded with a Common Rule office may compel other federal entities to conform to the rule; or entities may decide to conform voluntarily, but it is within their discretion not to.
Assurances. Second, a proposed activity may fall within the scope of the Common Rule due to the arrangements that an institution has with a Common Rule agency for IRB review. Some agencies, most notably the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), negotiate agreements with busy research institutions that cover not only the research activities at those institutions that are supported by the particular federal agency, but all of their research activities, regardless of the funding source. These agreements, called "multiple project assurances" (MPAs), set out the policies and procedures used by the institutions for reviewing research involving human subjects, and the institutions often-but not alwaysagree to apply the same policies and procedures to all their research activities. In this way, the Common Rule may be voluntarily extended beyond the minimal federal boundaries. Once the rule is voluntarily extended in this way, however, the institutions are obliged to conform to their agreements.
Agency Peculiarities. Third, for some federal agencies distinctive regulatory factors influence the scope of the Common Rule. Some agencies have adopted additional subparts to the Common Rule that provide further protections for certain vulnerable populations, one consequence of which is to alter the exemption status of research involving the vulnerable population. Also, the Common Rule exempts some research in which the confidentiality of the information collected is protected by legal statute, and such statutes may be specific to the activities of a federal agency or some part of that agency. Finally, the Common Rule reserves authority for the secretary or head of the specific federal agency or office to apply and interpret the Common Rule; consequently, designated agency officials from different agencies may apply the Common Rule differently. And the regulations give that same department or agency head the authority to apply the Common Rule to research activities even if they wouldn't otherwise be covered.
Other The definition requires that an investigation be systematic in order to qualify as research. People may ask questions in the course of an activity designed to find out something, but if the manner in which they are doing it is not sufficiently organized to call it a "systematic" process, then it does not count as "research." For example, if in the course of using a federal grant to provide food to needy children the grantee will have a series of conversations with providers in which the grantee will try to find out whether the children are eating the food, this would only count as research if the grantee plans to go about it in an organized way, deliberately using a certain set of questions or observational strategies. Obviously, there will sometimes be questions about the scope of the relevant terms-in our example, when a process becomes organized enough to be called "systematic." In any case, however, there must be some rationale for describing the knowledge-gathering activity as systematic in order for the Common Rule to apply. The definition specifically encompasses "research development, testing, and evaluation," which means that an activity labeled with any of these three terms (or other similar terms) may also qualify as research. In some definitions "research" is distinguished from "development," "testing," or "evaluation," implying that if a given activity is considered to fit one of these other three categories, it automatically cannot be labeled "research." In the Common Rule that is not the case: The regulatory boundary of "research" clearly encompasses activities that may also be properly described as development, testing, or evaluation.
" To conclude that a given activity is exempt under the Common Rule, all of the parts of the activity must fall within an exempt category. If any part of the activity falls within a covered category, then the activity must be considered covered, and go through IRB review.
Consider, for example, a proposed research activity about learning the Common Rule. If the proposed activity is to take place in a laboratory or a supermarket, this would not be considered an "established or commonly accepted educational setting" for this activity, and the research activity would be covered by the Common Rule. If, on the other hand, it is to take place in a conference facility or the classroom of a university bioethics course, this would represent a fairly typical educational setting for such learning and the analysis could go on to the next level of the diagram.
Continuing the same example, if the instructional strategy to be used is a lecture followed by a question and answer period, this would be considered "normal practice" and the research activity would qualify as exempt in this regard. If, on the other hand, the proposed research activity involves teaching the Common Rule by setting it to music and playing it repeatedly to the research subjects, this would represent an extraordinary or unusual practice, meaning that it would be covered by the Common Rule. Alternatively, if the real purpose of the activity is not to study an educational practice at all, but rather to study the physiological and psychological symptoms of stress displayed by people asked to accomplish an impossible intellectual task(!), then the proposed research would be covered by the Common Rule. If the research activity is designed to investigate both questions, the Common Rule would apply to the whole activity, even though some of its elements fit the exemption category.
Information.The second, third, and fourth categories of exempt research are somewhat interrelated. They all concern some aspect of the process of creating, reviewing, analyzing, or disclosing data and other forms of information, or for presenting research findings based on data. Accordingly, Common Rule interpreters may wish to look at these exemption categories together in the process of applying them to proposed research activities. In other words, all of the datahandling elements of a research activity may be considered together, to see if those elements correspond to any of the exempt categories.
Here again, the reader compares each element of the proposed research activity to the relevant sequence of categories until the reader reaches a category designated "covered" or "exempt." If all of the elements of a research activity fit a category marked "exempt" then the activity is exempt; if not, the activity is covered by the Common Rule and requires IRB review. (In Figure z the Public Benefit Programs. Exemption b (5) pertains to research concerning public benefit programs, and is diagrammed in Figure 3 .
The historical basis for this exemption derives from efforts by DHHS to study various aspects of the Social Security system. The Department's rationale for this exemption was that the kind of research involved was significantly different from biomedical and behavioral research with respect to the nature of the risks involved to human subjects, and that other review mechanisms in the department for such studies were more appropriate to protect the research subjects.5 The Common Rule does not provide a definition of "public benefit programs" that arguably could be construed as given activity that would then make a seemingly exempt activity covered. A complete set of the relevant categories of involvement of human subjects would have to be available in order to determine whether a given activity's "only" involvement falls within an exempt category (or categories). Consider a few illustrations of categories of involvement of human subjects whose relationships to the exempt categories in the Common Rule are undetermined at present, and that therefore call into question whether a given research activity involves human subjects "only" in an exempt category.
First, consider the category of "research involving IRB administrators." The Common Rule does not provide a logical basis for dismissing this category of involvement of human subjects. So, logically speaking, one could claim that all research involving IRB administrators is covered, even if it also falls into one or more of the exempt categories identified in ioi(b)(i)-(6). Common Rule interpreters are likely to dismiss this category, though it is clearly defined, because it seems to be a spurious and arbitrary category of involvement of human subjects unconnected to risk or ethical indignity.
"Research involving a surgical intervention," on the other hand, is certainly the kind of research that the Common Rule is meant to cover, but nowhere does the Common Rule explicitly list this category as covered. Yet logically, this category is related to the exempt categories in the same way as research involving IRB administrators.
The problem is that many other examples of categories of involvement of human subjects do not so easily divide themselves into those that common sense would suggest should be covered and those that should not. What about "classified research"? Or "research involving educationally disadvantaged people"? Or "research involving people in the District of Columbia or other U.S. territories"? These categories could arguably be associated with greater risks to subjects, and yet they are not commonly understood as representing a category of involvement of human subjects in the relevant sense of 1ol(b).
Logically speaking, the impact of this problem is to nullify any and all claims that research activities are exempt. Justifying an exemption claim requires knowing all of the classes of activity from which the exempt categories are drawn, so that one can classify the research activity as consisting of subjects' involvement only among the set of exempt categories. Since the former set of classes of activity remains unspecified, the task of vindicating any exemption claim is logically impossible.
As a practical matter, interpreters of the Common Rule currently exempt research projects on a regular basis, blithely ignoring the logical mistake they are making as they do so. Presumably, these interpreters rely on a tacit set of categories of involvement of human subjects that they believe represent the categories that should be covered, and so long as an exemption claim does not tread into one of those categories, they accept the claim. The discussion here suggests that consensus is unlikely among Common Rule interpreters as to the entire set of relevant categories which distinguish covered research and are separate from the exempt categories. From these examples it should be clear that research studies might include the cooperation of people who are not necessarily human subjects in the sense of the Common Rule. They demonstrate that research studies may vary with respect to whether they are interested in data about people's responses to questions or in data exclusively concerned with the objective content provided in those responses. And they suggest that the actual content of the questions asked in a research study may not fully resolve whether the research study involves data about living individuals or not. Finally, there is no sharp and bright line distinguishing research involving human subjects from research that merely involves people.
In this, as in many other areas, there are true borderline cases. The Common Rule should not be faulted simply because of this; so long as the gray area of the boundary is not unnecessarily wide, Common Rule interpreters must face the inevitable prospect of making some close calls. Presumably, in such cases interpreters of the Common Rule will look for whether the research activity involves potentially harmful or sensitive information about people's responses, and err on the side of using IRB review to protect them when such data are likely to be included. What is more troublesome is that a research activity may be clearly designed to develop or contribute to knowledge that is not about the living individuals, who nonetheless do participate in the research in some way and the data collected do in fact include potentially harmful information. In such circumstances, a research activity that does threaten people's welfare may miss IRB review.
Intentions [Primary] and Intentions [Secondary]. The Common Rule's definition of research stipulates not just that a research activity must develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge, but that it is designed to do so. As discussed previously, this notion of design or purpose narrows the scope of activities covered by the Common Rule. Some activities may in fact serve a research purpose, but unless they are undertaken with the intention of doing so, the Common Rule does not apply.
The question of whether an activity is being designed as research becomes more complicated with the realization that human activities may be designed to serve more than one objective: Workers may perform their duties both to fulfill their contractual obligations and to provide quality products to consumers, for example; adolescents may choose their wardrobe both to impress their friends and to challenge perceived authority figures; chief executive officers may contribute to charities both to support altruistic causes and to create personal tax benefits. And people may design an activity both to produce generalizable knowledge and to benefit the public. In cases of the last sort, does the Common Rule apply, or not?
The Common Rule does not directly address the question how to choose among more than one option when an activity reflects multiple designs, although it does appear to recognize the possibility of multiple intentions. This is most obvious when the Common Rule refers to applied research, when the researchers have some reason to believe that their intervention will be therapeutic or beneficial to the subjects and that their activity also promises to provide important data. But while the Common Rule implies that some such activities with multiple purposes are within its purview, it does not explicitly provide a way to distinguish clearly which activities should count as research when the activities reflect multiple purposes, one of which is research oriented.
Some Common Rule interpreters have suggested that the way to resolve this issue is to draw a distinction between primary and secondary intention.6 On this view, the Common Rule applies only if the primary intention of the activity is to produce generalizable knowledge. Some activities that clearly include research-related considerations may still not count as research if their primary intention is something else, e.g., public health surveillance, emergency responses, or program evaluations to improve the quality of service delivered. Research objectives are included in these activities and are reflected in various aspects of their design, but they should not by virtue of this secondary intention be considered research covered by the Common Rule, interpreters argue.
The problem with this position is that it separates the intention to provide a public benefit from the intention to develop generalizable knowledge, and arbitrarily assigns priority to the former. This separation flies in the face of the reality that a considerable number of research activities derive their focus from the researchers' interest in solving some practical problem. Indeed, the argument has been made that the most successful research activities have been driven by a combination of scientific and public benefit interests.7 It makes no sense to try to disentangle the research and other intentions in such use-inspired basic research, and probably in other activities as well. The appeal to primary ver-sus secondary intention does not tend to enlighten application of the Common Rule.
A better approach might be to adopt a more pragmatic perspective that also appeals to the ethical standpoint underlying the Common Rule. The Common Rule is designed to govern research activity, when research is understood to have a particular ethical status in society. In the United States today, research is taken to be a socially desirable activity, but not an imperative one. In other words, the public benefits of research are great enough to warrant public support for research, but the benefits are not such that society is willing to compel people's cooperation in it. The Common Rule is in fact designed to preserve and enhance the reputation of research, as well as to protect research subjects. (Indeed, it would be arbitrary to say that one or the other is the primary intention of procedures identified under the Common Rule.) The heart of the IRB review procedures reflects this ethical status: IRBs may approve or disapprove a project, meaning that it might be desirable but it is not ethically imperative that research take place. And individuals may consent or decline to participate, meaning that it might be desirable but it is not ethically imperative for anyone to participate in research.
If the Common Rule is designed to protect people participating in an activity that is socially desirable but not mandatory, then the issue of whether to view a particular activity as research should be approached with this in mind. If an activity is designed in such a way as to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge, and participation in it is voluntary, then the Common Rule should apply. If, on the other hand, society legitimately declares that an activity's public benefit is so compelling as to require participation-as in, for example, certain disease-reporting activities, or data collected under the U.S. Census, which are required in order to administer various legal rights and servicesthen the provisions of the Common Rule should not apply. It makes no sense to review an activity's plans for securing informed consent if refusing to participate is unacceptable.
This position is only defensible if society limits itself to compelling people to participate in activities when it has a legitimate basis for doing so. Examining where to draw that line is beyond the reach of the Common Rule, beyond the realm of human research activity, and beyond the scope of this essay.
